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Abstract—The Bit Flipping algorithm is a hard decision
decoding algorithm originally designed by Gallager in 1962 to
decode Low Density Parity Check Codes (LDPC). It has recently
proved to be much more versatile, for Moderate Parity Check
Codes (MDPC) or Euclidean metric. We further demonstrate its
power by proposing a noisy Euclidean version of it. This tweak
allows to construct a lattice based key exchange analogous to the
Ouroboros protocol for Hamming metric but with a reduction
to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. The very efficient
decoding algorithm permits to consider smaller alphabets than
for NTRU or Ring-LWE decryption algorithms. Overall we
obtain a new protocol which competes with the recent NEWHOPE
and KYBER proposals, and also with NTRU. The resulting scheme
exploits the cyclicity of the error, and benefits from the security
of the renowned SIS problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The NTRU lattice-based protocol was introduced in 1996.
This protocol was a major breakthrough since it made practical
lattice-based cryptography by the use of cyclicity, which made
the size of the public key very small. Meanwhile the security
of the system did not rely on a classical problem like SIS
but rather relied on finding small (Euclidean) weight vectors
in a special matrix generated by small weight vectors. Even
if this type of problem is still hard to attack, it remains a
specific and not a general problem (although for extreme
parameters, not used in practice, such a reduction could be
obtained [16]). This means that there may exist specific better
attacks for this problem. A few years later, Regev introduced
the LWE algorithm, based on a general problem, and in 2010
an ideal-ring version was proposed in [13]. The latter has the
advantage to be both practical (like NTRU) and to benefit
from a reduction to a general problem based on ideal-rings.
A similar idea of using a dual small weight vector generator
matrix as trapdoor was also used for other metrics: MDPC
codes [14] (based on Gallager’s LDPC codes) for Hamming
metric, and LRPC codes [8] for rank metric. These coding
approaches see the decryption algorithm purely as a decoding
algorithm, when the NTRU decryption algorithm does not
decode but recover the plaintext by using modular properties
and the fact that there is a controlled noise of quadratic
size. An equivalent approach to RLWE was also proposed
in 2016 for Hamming and rank metric, the HQC and RQC
protocols [1].
In 2016, Guo and Johansson [9], [10] proposed a decoding
algorithm (and an encryption scheme) for the Euclidean metric
in the spirit of MDPC and LRPC codes but as for NTRU, the
associated encryption algorithm relies on finding small weight
vectors in a specific matrix. The advantage of their approach
is that as for MDPC and LRPC codes, the purely decoding
approach is more efficient than the decryption approach of
NTRU.
In 2017 Deneuville et al. [7] introduced Ouroboros for
Hamming metric which is based on a modification of the
MDPC algorithm: a noisy-MDPC decoder. This permits to
benefit from the nice feature of the MDPC decoder for
decryption, together with a reduction to a generic problem
(decoding random quasi-cyclic codes) rather than on a specific
problem (finding very small vectors in a code generated by
very small weight vectors). In this present paper we adapt the
Ouroboros approach to Euclidean metric context.
The different previous approaches for ideal-lattices are as
follows:
• NTRU has a security reduction to a specific problem
(NTRU lattices) and deals with quadratic size error (of
the form x·y for x and y small weight vectors embedded
with polynomial multiplication). NTRU has an efficient
decryption algorithm but has to deal with quadratic size
errors,
• RLWE has a reduction to a general problem and deals
with quadratic size errors of the form x1 · y2 + x2 · y1
with an efficient decryption algorithm,
• Guo-Johansson decryption algorithm is based on a de-
coding approach (a p-ary Bit Flipping algorithm in the
spirit of MDPC or LRPC codes), for NTRU-like matrices.
It is not necessarily efficient for decoding large weight
errors, but is very efficient to decode small norm errors
with small coordinates (typically {−1, 0, 1}), so that in
practice it is more efficient to deal with smaller errors for
a less efficient algorithm than dealing with larger errors
for a more efficient decoding algorithm (like NTRU or
RLWE). In practice it means that it is possible to consider
smaller alphabets than for NTRU or RLWE for the
same type of decryption failure rate (DFR). The security
reduction of the Guo-Johansson encryption algorithm is
similar to NTRU with a specific problem.
In this paper we develop the Ouroboros approach for the
Guo-Johansson encryption algorithm which permits to obtain
as for RLWE a new encryption scheme with a security
reduction to a general problem, but also benefits from an
efficient decryption algorithm: the noisy p-ary Bit Flipping
algorithm for Euclidean metric, applied on smaller errors to
decode. The general idea of Ouroboros is to use the structure
of the quadratic size error to decode: starting from a quadratic
size errors of the form x1 · y2 + x2 · y1 + e. The Ouroboros
approach sees the error as a syndrome associated to an error
vector (x1,x2, e) for a matrix built from y1 and y2. So that
the decryption consists in recovering x1 and x2 from x1,x2, e
knowing y1 and y2: the noisy-q-ary-BitFlipping algorithm
introduced in this paper.
Overall our new protocol benefits from the good features
of the Guo-Johansson decoding algorithm but has also a
reduction to a general problem. In practice it permits to obtain
much smaller alphabets than for NTRU, RLWE or the recent
Kyber [5] and NewHope [2]. We consider alphabets of size
512 when other protocols consider sizes between 2048 and
12289. Our approach may permit to obtain a 20% gain in the
size of the public key for similar security levels and DFR.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Sec. II provides some background on notations and the SIS
problem, then a lattice version of the Bit Flipping algorithm
is proposed in Sec. III, along with a key exchange protocol.
A security proof is presented in Sec. IV.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notations
Throughout this paper, Z denotes the ring of integers
and Fq (for q ∈ Z a prime or a power of a prime) a
finite field. Vectors and polynomials (resp. matrices) will
be denoted in bold lower (resp. upper) case. While the
Coding Theory community uses row vectors, fellows from
Lattices prefer column notation. Since our work considers
both fields, we do not specify a particular notation and leave
it implicit in the context. Additionally, we denote by ω(·)
and ‖ · ‖ respectively the Hamming weight of a vector and
its `2 euclidean norm. More formally, for v ∈ Fnq , we
have: ω (v) = card ({i ∈ [[0, n− 1]] s.t. vi 6= 0}), and‖v‖ =√∑n−1
i=0 v
2
i . Additionally, we denote Snw (F) the set of words
in Fn whose metric is equal to w. Formally: Snw (F2) =
{x ∈ Fn2 , such that ω(x) = w} for Hamming metric, and
Snw (Fq) =
{




Let V denotes a vector space of dimension n over Fq for
some positive n ∈ Z. Elements of V can be interchangeably
considered as vectors or polynomials in R = Fq[x]/(xn− 1).
For u,v ∈ V , we define their product similarly as in R,
i.e. uv = w ∈ V with wk =
∑
i+j≡k mod n uivj , for k ∈
[[0, n − 1]]. Additionally, Id = {−d, . . . , 0, . . . , d}, x(d)0 =




(2d+1)2 e(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
B. Lattice problems
In this Section, we recall one of the most famous average-
case lattice problems that has a connection to worst-case
lattice problems, namely the Short Integer Solution (SIS). The
security of the Ouroboros-E protocol described in Sec. III-A
will rely on the hardness of this problem.
Definition 1 (SISq,n,m,β problem). Given A
$← Fn×mq , the
SISq,n,m,β problem asks to find a non-zero vector z ∈ Zm
such that Az = 0 and ‖z‖ ≤ β.
Definition 2 (SISq,n,m,d distribution). Sample A
$← Fn×mq
and z $← {−d, . . . , 0, . . . , d}m uniformly at random, and
output (A,Az).
Definition 3 (Search SISq,n,m,d). Let χ denote the SISq,n,m,d
distribution. Given (A, t)← χ, find z ∈ {−d, . . . , 0, . . . , d}m
such that Az = t.
Definition 4 (Decisional SISq,n,m,d). Given (A, t) ∈ Fn×mq ×
Fnq , the SISq,n,m,d decisional problem asks to decide with non-
negligible advantage whether it comes from the SISq,n,m,d
distribution or the uniform distribution over Fn×mq × Fnq .
A simple pigeonhole argument allows to see that in order
for a solution to the problem to exist, both the norm β and
the number of columns m must be large enough, namely
β ≥
√
dn log2 qe and m ≥ dn log2 qe. For the last two
problems where an upper bound d on the absolute value of the
coefficients is provided, the relation between the parameters
defines the hardness of the problem. For d  qn/m, the
SISq,n,m,d problem has only one solution with high proba-
bility, and the problem is said of low-density. On the contrary





. Therefore, it is reason-
able to argue that the hardest instances of the SIS problem are
those for which d ≈ qn/m [15].
III. PROPOSAL
A. Euclidean Ouroboros: Ouroboros-E
To construct a lattice key exchange analogue of the
Ouroboros protocol, we need to introduce some modifications.
We adopt in the general case that x = x(d)0 + x̂ and
y = y
(d)
0 + ŷ, where d is a suitable constant and x̂, ŷ
$← Ind .
Sampling at random from Ind instead of Snw (Fq) with d ≈
O(w/
√
n) ≈ O(1) yields a more efficient variant. In this case,
we can let x = x(d)0 + x̂ and y = y
(d)
0 + ŷ, which is preferred
in decoding. We have other proposals in-between, by using a
different noise distribution.
We also introduce the noisy-q-ary-BitFlipping, described in
Alg. 1. It is a fast decoding algorithm for the efficient variant
with d = 1 which is the case we propose. The generalization
to d > 1 is direct, but additional optimization is necessary.
With these modifications we now give the new Ouroboros-
E protocol (Ouroboros using Euclidean metric) using the pro-
posed noisy-q-ary-BitFlipping algorithm, depicted in Fig. 1.
It requires a Hash function from {0, 1}∗ which produce
small norm vectors in Ind . Such functions can be found in
NewHope [2] for instance.
B. A noisy q-ary bit flipping algorithm
We modify the q-ary iterative decoding algorithm [10]
in Alg. 1 with tweaks for managing noisy syndromes and
introducing efficient performance. The algorithm takes as input
the two known vectors x,y of the form as described above,
a known (syndrome) vector ec, and algorithm parameter t for
the number of iterations. The decoding algorithm will deliver
r1, r2 ∈ Ind such that ec − xr2 + yr1 is very small.
This new algorithm is a one-step hard-decision version
aiming for the decoding efficiency, which also adopts the
special structure of the Ouroboros family of Key Exchange
protocols [7]. In the description, the rot operation transforms
a polynomial (vector) over the ring R to a matrix over Fq .
As we only consider d = 1 in the proposal, we have 9
signal points to place (two significant entries are chosen in
a parity-check equation and each of them is sampled from
{−1, 0, 1}). We equally divide the cycle [[0, q]] (mod q) into
9 intervals and make decisions accordingly. The latter is trivial
and adopted in almost all lattice-based cryptosystems.
The non-trivial part is that, other than some small noise
added (e.g., the noise variable e in Alg. 1), the noise entries
in one parity-check equation are also signal points in several
other parity-check equations, which can be corrected itera-
tively. Thus, if the majority of the secret entries are correctly
decided in the first iteration, then the noise in the second
iteration will be much smaller, which leads to better decisions,
and so on and so forth.
Therefore, the field size can be highly reduced as we only
need a good success probability in the first iteration – in
contrast to other schemes requiring the one-iteration1 error
probability close to 0.
IV. SECURITY
A. Security model
Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). The proposed Key
Exchange protocol follows the KEM paradigm. It is meant
to exchange (ephemeral) session keys using a public key
encryption scheme. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the
scheme satisfies INDistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext
Attacks (IND-CPA for short).
Beyond passive adversaries. Notice that it is pretty straight-
forward to obtain a CCA-secure KEM from a CPA onesimply
by involving the message (or key being exchanged) in the
hash (the value committed by Bob in the second step). On
recovering Bob’s randomness r1 and r2, Alice can check
whether Bob followed the protocol or tried to fool her.
1These decoding procedures only run one iteration.
Algorithm 1: Noisy-q-ary-BitFlipping(x,y, ec, t)
Input: x,y, ec = xr1 + yr2 + e, and number of
iterations t, where x = x(1)0 + x̂, y = y
(1)
0 + ŷ,
and x̂, ŷ, r1, r2, e
$← In1
Output: (r1, r2) if the algorithm succeeds, ⊥ otherwise.









∈ Fn×2nq , psyndrome ← ec;
2 for i = 0; i ≤ t; i++ do





4 for j ∈ [[0, n− 1]] do
5 if psyndrome[j] ∈ [[d q6e, b
q
2c]] then
6 utemp[j] = 1;
7 else if psyndrome[j] ∈ [[d q2e, b
5q
6 c]] then
8 utemp[j] = −1;
9 else
10 utemp[j] = 0;





12 vtemp[j] = 1;






14 vtemp[j] = −1;
15 else
16 vtemp[j] = 0;
17 u← u+ utemp;
18 v← v + vtemp;
19 for j ∈ [[0, n− 1]] do
20 if u[j] = 2 then
21 u[j] = −1;
22 if u[j] = −2 then
23 u[j] = 1;
24 if v[j] = 2 then
25 v[j] = −1;
26 if v[j] = −2 then
27 v[j] = 1;
28 psyndrome ← ec −H× (u,v)>;




The semantic security of Ouroboros-E relies on the follow-
ing problem: finding the exchanged secret given pk and the
transcripts. (Lattice attacks targeting key-recovery are covered
Sec. IV-C.) The following (main) theorem reduces these two
problems to the hardness of the SIS problem.




$← {0, 1}λ, h seedh← Fnq , x̂, ŷ
$← Ind ,
x← x(d)0 + x̂, y← y
(d)
0 + ŷ, s← x+ hy
ec ← se − ysr








sr ← r1 + hr2
se ← sr2 + e
Hash(r1, r2)
Fig. 1. General description of our Ouroboros-E Key Exchange protocol. h and s constitute the public key. h can be recovered by publishing only the λ bits
of the seed (instead of the n coordinates of h).
The proof follows the same ideas as the original one from [1,
Proof of Theorem 1].
Proof. To prove the IND-CPA property, we need to prove
that an adversary A is unable to distinguish between honest
and fake runs of the protocol. We are going to proceed in
a sequence of games moving from the real world with a
valid execution of the protocol, to an idealistic version where
both the ciphertext and the key are random. Let A be a
probabilistic polynomial time adversary against the IND-CPA
of our scheme and consider the following games where we
consider that A receives the encapsulation at the end of each
game.
Game G1: This game corresponds to an honest run of the
protocol. In particular, the simulator has access to all keys
/ randomness.
Game G2: Now the simulator picks uniformly at random x,y
(except for the first coordinate), resulting in a random s.
He then proceeds honestly.
An adversary distinguishing between those two games,
can distinguish between a well-formed pk and a random
one. The public key in the first game correspond to a valid
SIS instance, while it is a random one in the second.
Hence AdvG1−G2A ≤ AdvSIS(λ)
Game G3: Now the simulator also picks uniformly at random
e, r1 and r2 and uses them to generate sr, se.











The syndrome (sr, se) follows the SIS distribution in





If an adversary is able to distinguish games G2 from G3,
then a simulator can break the underlying problem.
Hence AdvG2−G3A ≤ AdvSIS(λ).
AdvindcpaKEM (A) ≤ 2 · AdvSIS(λ).
Therefore, a PPT adversary A breaking the protocol with
non negligible advantage can be used to solve the SIS problem.
C. Lattice attacks
Due to space restrictions, we only mention the attacks
considered to set the parameters. We refer the reader to [3]
and its citations for a panorama of such attacks.
The most trivial attack would be an exhaustive search one
the secret key x̂, ŷ, where each part is a trinary n-dimensional
vector with roughly the same number of coordinates equal to




/n operations, where the division by n accounts for the
ring structure. Such attacks are way unpractical.
Lattice reduction is probably the most famous type of
attacks among lattice attacks. The best lattice reduction al-
gorithm is BKZ 2.0 [6]. Its running time is exponential in
the lattice dimension n and strongly depends on the root
Hermite factor (RHF) δ. A conservative estimate for the
logarithm of the running time is given in [12] by: tBKZ(δ) =
1.8/ log(δ) − 110. Such attacks have been considered out of
range for RHF below 1.005. They tend to be superseded by
sieving and/or enumeration approaches.
Hybrid attacks were introduced in [11] and benefit from the
best of the two previous approaches. Nevertheless, due to the
dimension of the lattices considered, they are also inefficient.
Enumeration algorithms performs better than sieving algo-
rithms for small dimensions, but have a much worse asymp-
totic complexity than the latter, both in time and space.
Finally, the best (known) sieving algorithm [4] runs in time
(3/2)
n/2+o(n) ≈ 20.292n and space (4/3)n/2+o(n) ≈ 20.207n.
We set our parameters to make such attacks out of range.
D. Parameters
In Tab. I, threshold denotes the maximum number of itera-
tions to recover the error, DFR and RHF stands for “decryption
failure rate” and “root Hermite factor” respectively, and tLS
and sLS denote the time and space required for best known
lattice sieving techniques.The corresponding key and transcript
sizes are provided in Tab. II.
E. Further works
A first research axis is the failure probability: the DFR
reported in Tab. I was verified experimentally. We believe it
is much below 2−32 and actually closer to 2−λ for λ bits
of security. This belief is supported by other experiments on
TABLE I
PARAMETER SETS FOR OUROBOROS-E.
Instance n q d threshold security DFR RHF tLS sLS
Toy 293 512 1 18 80  2−32 1.0033 85 60
Standard 389 512 1 20 100  2−32 1.0025 113 80
Advanced 491 512 1 23 128  2−32 1.0020 140 99
TABLE II
KEYS AND TRANSCRIPT SIZES IN BYTES FOR OUROBOROS-E.
Instance pk size sk size transcript sizefull seed full seed A→B B→A
Toy 660 340 147 84 340 660
Standard 876 451 195 110 451 876
Advanced 1,105 569 246 139 569 1,105
smaller moduli, plotted in Fig. 2. A more precise analysis will
be conducted in a extended version of this work.
Fig. 2. Logarithm of the observed probability that a decryption failure
occurs as function of the modulus q (dots), and a conservative quadratic
approximation (curve).
Assuming the binary logarithm of the DFR behaves like
a quadratic function of q (which seems reasonable given the
shape of the curve induced by the plots), we can derive a con-
servative extrapolation. The latter gives DFR(512) < 2−130.
Another research axis is the variants of the protocol. It
is also possible to instantiate the Ouroboros protocol in a
regular, non-ideal way. While this might give more confidence
about the underlying problems, this would yield much worse
parameters. It is also possible to consider other rings such
as Fq[x]/(xn + 1), which would yield even better efficiency
thanks to fast implementation techniques (FFT).
Additionally, it is also possible to consider the dual version
of this protocol, where the public key is no longer an SIS
instance of the secret key, but rather an LWE instance of it,
i.e. a lattice point shifted by some small secret noise. This
version was not detailed here due to space restrictions.
CONCLUSION
In this abstract, we adapted the Ouroboros framework [7]
to build key exchange protocols to the euclidean metric. We
show that it is possible to modify the lattice Bit Flipping
algorithm from [10] to handle noisy syndromes. The resulting
protocol is competitive with existing KEMs, and features
smaller alphabets.
Finally, our non-optimized C++ implementation takes from
2 to 7ms depending on the parameter sets, on an Intel R©
CoreTM i7-6920HQ CPU @ 2.90GHz (turboboost disabled).
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